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A happiness fit for organic bodies:
La Mettrie’s medical Epicureanism1
CHARLES T. WOLFE
C’est dans son exposition du syste`me d’Epicure
que La Mettrie se donne surtout carrie`re; car [...]
cette exposition n’en est pas une, et n’est qu’une
forme donne´e au propre mate´rialisme de
l’auteur.
Jean-Philibert Damiron, Me´moires pour servir a`
l’histoire de la philosophie au XVIIIe sie`cle, vol.1
Julien Offroy de La Mettrie (1709-1751), the great, scandalous materialist
from Saint-Malo best known as the author of L’Homme-machine (1748),
and probably the first important thinker to refer to himself explicitly as a
materialist,2 described his system as ‘e´picuro-carte´sien’ in a minor work,
Les Animaux plus que machines (1750), in the context of an apparent
critique of those who think the body has primacy over the soul. I say
‘apparent’ because his critique is in bad faith: in fact, La Mettrie uses the
excuse of an anonymously published work to supposedly attack the ideas
of ‘the author of L’Homme-machine’, which enables him to further expli-
cate these ideas and give them greater publicity. Discussing the status of
the will, understanding and sensation – in their relation to the soul or to
the body? – he refers to those who wrongly (i.e. in fact rightly) relate them
to bodily mechanisms: ‘ce que certains attribuent au me´canisme des
corps anime´s, dans leur syste`me e´picuro-carte´sien retourne´ et mal
cousu’.3 La Mettrie is providing the reader with an important hint as
to the nature of his system: it is ‘e´picuro-carte´sien’.
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1. I would like to thank Hans Blom, Dario Perinetti and John Robertson for their comments
on this article.
2. As noted by Olivier Bloch, ‘Le mate´rialisme et la Re´volution franc¸aise’, in Bloch,Matie`re a`
histoires (Paris, 1997), p.321-47 (328).
3. In Julien Offroy de La Mettrie,Œuvres philosophiques, ed. Francine Markovits, 2 vols (Paris,
1987), p.311. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to this edition, and translations
are my own. Title abbreviations are the following: AS for Abre´ge´ des syste`mes; DB forDiscours
sur le bonheur;DP forDiscours pre´liminaire; EE for Epıˆtre a` mon esprit;HM for L’Homme-machine;
HNA for Histoire naturelle de l’aˆme (also known as Traite´ de l’aˆme); SE for Syste`me d’Epicure.
Onemight wonder what this system is,4 and the simplest answer would
be to reconstruct the Epicurean and Cartesian traditions of which La
Mettrie is the inheritor. On the Epicurean side this consists of (in a
restrictive sense, without referring to figures like Saint-Evremond)
Gassendi and the physician Guillaume Lamy, but also Montaigne; on
the Cartesian side, radicalisers such as Regius, Re´gis, La Forge, Steno or
Saint-Hyacinthe. Cyrano de Bergerac should also be mentioned, as an
early synthesiser of Cartesianism and Epicureanism in physics, a syn-
thesis which is also characteristic of the culture of clandestine manu-
scripts and their method of collage of various existing sources in radical
thought (explicitly in anonymous texts such as L’Ame mate´rielle or the
Traite´ des trois imposteurs), with a frequently reproduced page of Lamy’s
dealing with animal spirits and the ‘world soul’.5
As to what La Mettrie himself meant by a ‘syste`me e´picuro-carte´sien’,
the key is the phrase ‘animate bodies’: this should tell us that epicuro-
Cartesianism is not just a grafting of Epicurean hedonism in ethics onto
a Cartesian mechanistic framework for understanding bodies. Instead,
with the theme of small parcels of animate matter (e.g. semences), it speaks
to the tradition of Epicurean medicine – perhaps one should speak of
neo-Epicurean medicine, since apart from the existence of a school of
Epicurean physicians in antiquity, of which we know very little, and a
recognition in Lucretius of the specificity of living beings, the specifically
medical argument in Lamy and La Mettrie seems to be a modern
development.6 Indeed, Olivier Bloch has described Epicurean medicine
as ultimately a rather literary medicine – ‘une me´decine assez litte´raire
en somme [...] qui se re´clame de De´mocrite et Lucre`ce face a` Aristote et
Galien’.7 Another indication that Epicurean medicine might be some-
thing of a construct is Diderot’s article ‘Epicure´isme’ in the Encyclope´die,
which names as ‘disciples of Epicurus’ mostly literary figures such as
Saint-Evremond or Ninon de Lenclos.8 The theme of an Epicurean
medicine is also a construct of the period inasmuch as it occurs in
apocryphal tales such as that recounting an encounter on amountaintop
between Democritus and Hippocrates, with the former dissecting
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4. I have discussed this aspect of La Mettrie’s thought at greater length in ‘‘‘Epicuro-
Cartesianism’’: La Mettrie’s materialist transformation of early modern philosophy’, in La
Mettrie: Ansichte und Einsichte: proceedings of the 2001 La Mettrie conference, ed. Hartmut Hecht
(Berlin, 2004), p.75-96.
5. On these radical traditions see Henri Busson’s still invaluable La Religion des classiques
(Paris, 1948).
6. I am grateful to Pierre-Franc¸ois Moreau for this suggestion.
7. O. Bloch, ‘L’he´ritage libertin dans la pense´e des Lumie`res’, Dix-huitie`me sie`cle 24 (1992),
p.73-82 (79).
8. AramVartanian, LaMettrie’s ‘L’Homme-machine’: a study in the origins of an idea (Princeton, NJ,
1960), p.58.
corpses in order to find the ‘seat’ of melancholia.9 Of course, none of this
affects the concept of ‘medical Epicureanism’ put forth here with respect
to LaMettrie, since it is not a concept derived from or subsumable under
the history of medicine – a history to which he hardly belongs. After all,
La Mettrie is happy to name not only Epicurus but also Marcus Aurelius
and Montaigne as his ‘physicians’ (DB, p.265)!
In what follows, I hope to show that both La Mettrie’s materialism and
his ethics are Epicurean in a unique and coherent way, which hinges on
this understanding of ‘animate bodies’ and, as we shall see, the only kind
of happiness that might possibly be fit for them. These comprise what I
suggest is his ‘medical Epicureanism’.
La Mettrie’s materialism
We should note that La Mettrie proclaims himself to be an Epicurean in
the broad sense, as the author of a Syste`me d’Epicure, not of a Syste`me de
Descartes. In section 41 of this work, he says that he has feebly ventured to
identify himself with Epicurus, and elsewhere he identifies himself
ideologically with Epicureanism qua materialism.10 The Cartesian side
of ‘epicuro-Cartesianism’ receives less emphasis in his work, even if he
sometimes says that Descartes was really a materialist (but this may be
more of a rhetorical gesture to embrace all predecessors and claim that
their thought reaches its ultimate fulfilment in his own). Ann Thomson
has emphasised, in this regard, that it is not helpful or fully accurate to
interpret La Mettrie as a renegade Cartesian, or as a more materialistic-
ally oriented reader of Lockean sensationism.11 Indeed, the figure of
Epicureanism might be more important than either of those two figures.
My concern here is not with early modern Epicureanism in general,
but with amore specific tradition to which LaMettrie belongs, and which
he transforms in an original way: Epicurean medicine. Its most import-
ant figure was the Paris physician Guillaume Lamy (1644?-1683), chiefly
in his works De principiis rerum (1669), Discours anatomiques (1675) and
Explication me´canique et physique des fonctions de l’aˆme sensitive (1677).12 Lamy
sought to articulate a combination of atomism (initially Gassendian) and
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9. Mariana Saad, ‘Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, Volney: science de l’homme et e´picurisme’,Dix-
huitie`me sie`cle 35, L’Epicurisme des Lumie`res (2003), p.103-105.
10. See for instance AS, p.275, where La Mettrie quotes Bayle’s article ‘Lucre`ce’ from the
Dictionnaire, thereby confirming Damiron’s suspicions as voiced in the above epigraph.
11. Most recently, in her ‘La Mettrie et l’e´picurisme’, in Der Garten und die Moderne: Epikureische
Moral und Politik vom Humanismus zur Aufkla¨rung, ed. Gianni Paganini and Edoardo
Tortarolo (Stuttgart, 2004), p.361-81.
12. On Lamy, see Busson, La Religion des classiques; A. Thomson, ‘Guillaume Lamy et l’aˆme
mate´rielle’, Dix-huitie`me sie`cle 24 (1992), p.63-71, and Anna Minerbi Belgrado’s extensive
and extremely informative introduction to her edition of Lamy’s Discours anatomiques &
explication me´chanique et physique des fonctions de l’aˆme sensitive (Oxford, 1996). For additional
Cartesian science understood as a rejection of final causes, but ultimately
rejected Gassendi’s ‘Christianised Epicureanism’, in which the structure
of organism is already a sign of purposiveness throughout the universe.13
As Henri Busson put it, ‘Lamy is the first to move, by a necessary logic,
from Gassendi’s watered-down atomism to Lucretius’ genuinely materi-
alist atomism.’14 When La Mettrie uses classic Epicurean–Lucretian
themes such as our eyes, which are not ‘made for seeing’ but with which
we see because we have them, these themes are in fact derived from
Lamy,15 whom he quotes approvingly in his early Histoire naturelle de l’aˆme,
mentions in L’Homme-machine and, as we shall see, describes in curious
terms in the later Abre´ge´ des syste`mes.16
The key difference between them is that Lamy (following Gassendi and
then Willis)17 made use of the Epicurean distinction between the aˆme
sensitive and the rational soul, mainly as a way of concealing a material-
istic, reductionistic position in which the brain is the ‘source’ or ‘reser-
voir’ of the soul (Explication, p.152-53). Yet hemaintains an active concept
of ‘soul’, albeit a materialised soul. Unlike Cyrano before him and
Diderot after him, Lamy does not believe that all of matter senses: there
is an essential variety within matter, such that the soul, for instance, is a
body which possesses ‘a particular nature, different from other bodies’
(p.147). His medical reductionism is thus not an ontological
eliminativism, that is, his construal of higher-level, mental properties
in bodily and globally physiological terms does not mean that he is
denying their existence outright, but rather seeking to integrate them
into a unified medical (and materialist) perspective. La Mettrie appears
in contrast to proceed further with his reduction, for after the Histoire
naturelle de l’aˆme, he will dispense with the concept of soul altogether.
Much interesting work remains to be done on the intriguing concept of a
‘material soul’ in this period (Is it tantamount to a proto-subjectivity
within a materialist framework? Does it set the stage for what will
become the science of psychology?, etc.); suffice it to say that La Mettrie
is quite close to Lamy in a variety of ways, not least the articulation of a
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biographical information, see Alain Mothu, ‘La mort de Guillaume Lamy’, La Lettre
clandestine 2 (1993), p.32-35, also available online at http://www.univ-paris12.fr/scd/lc2-
2d.htm.
13. Lamy, Discours anatomiques, p.116-17, 123ff.
14. Busson, La Religion des classiques, p.149.
15. Lamy,Discours anatomiques, 2e discours, p.61 (compare Lucretius,De rerum natura, IV.823ff.).
16. HNA, p.147, 188, 267; HM, p.96; AS, p.252 (Lamy rightfully suspects Descartes of having
been a materialist) and especially AS, p.267.
17. For a good summary of Willis’ theory of a material, ‘Epicurean’ soul as a ‘life-principle’,
see John P. Wright, ‘Locke, Willis and the Epicurean soul’, in Atoms, pneuma, and tranquility:
Epicurean and Stoic themes in European thought, ed. Margaret J. Osler (Cambridge, 1991),
p.239-58.
connection between medical discourse and traditional philosophical
discourse, though they differ on the status of the soul.18
As I have indicated, however, there is another passage in the Abre´ge´ des
syste`mes which is important for our discussion; it is both convoluted and
rich with implications. In it, La Mettrie actually discusses Hermann
Boerhaave (1668-1738), the renowned iatromechanist physician and
medical reformer, with whom he purportedly studied in Leyden (and
whose work he translated).19 His aim is to defend Boerhaave against the
charge of Spinozism: ‘personne ne fut moins Spinosiste’ (AS, p.267).
Boerhaave is not a Spinozist since he (supposedly) saw God’s work
everywhere in nature; therefore, La Mettrie adds, he is not to be ident-
ified with the two modern Epicureans, Gassendi and Lamy!20 Gassendi
and Lamy are the ‘Epicuriens Modernes’ who dismiss finalism and
teleology when it comes to the structure of the human body. Once we
remove the rhetorically added negation from this description,
Boerhaave, Gassendi and Lamy appear to belong to the same ‘party’ –
not that, in reality, a Newtonian mechanist physician, an Epicurean
philosopher and an Epicurean physician belong to an identical context,
but even Boerhaave the ‘mechanist’ describes medicine in a late work
rather non-mechanistically as the science of reactions in the body,
including those it elicits in other bodies.21 Radical motifs, whether
Epicurean, Spinozist or otherwise materialistic, traverse the works and,
equally importantly, the personas of these three admired predecessors of
La Mettrie; in that sense they form a theoretical whole. From the La
Mettrian standpoint, Boerhaave, Gassendi and Lamy are strategic allies
in the process of complexifying mechanism with a focus on the animate
features of the bodily machine.
In other words, to be a ‘modern Epicurean’ for LaMettrie is not just to
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18. La Mettrie discusses the related Epicurean theme of the ‘residual’ soul (HM, p.107-108),
but finds it too obscure and prefers the Leibnizian idea of a ‘force motrice’. On the
concept of the ‘material soul’ in the clandestine tradition, including in Lamy, see Aram
Vartanian, ‘Quelques re´flexions sur le concept d’aˆme dans la litte´rature clandestine’, in Le
Mate´rialisme du XVIIIe sie`cle et la litte´rature clandestine, ed. Olivier Bloch (Paris, 1982), p.149-
65.
19. J. O. de La Mettrie, Institutions de me´decine de M. Herman Boerhaave, 2 vols, then 3 (Paris,
Huart & Cie, 1739, 1750).
20. ‘On voit [...] combien ceMe´decin ce´le`bre e´tait diffe´rent de ces deux EpicuriensModernes,
Gassendi et Lami’ (AS, p.267).
21. Boerhaave, Discourse on servitude as the physician’s glory (1730), in Boerhaave’s Orations, ed. and
translated by Elze Kegel-Brinkgreve and Antonie M. Luyendijk-Elshout (Leiden, 1983),
p.237-63, cited in Hubert Steinke, Irritating experiments: Haller’s concept and the European
controversy on irritability and sensibility, 1750-90 (Amsterdam, 2005), p.32. Harold Cook, in his
recent study of the role of Dutch science and commerce in the scientific revolution,
Matters of exchange (NewHaven, CT, 2007), describes Boerhaave as an Epicurean both in his
physics and in his ethics (p.385).
be, say, an atheist or a hedonist, which is what most early moderns meant
when they attacked someone for being an Epicurean – or even a ‘modern
Epicurean’, since usage of the term is not restricted to La Mettrie:
Shaftesbury, for one, deplores that ‘The Satisfactions which are purely
mental, and depend only on the Motion of a Thought; must in all
likelihood be too refin’d for the Apprehensions of our modern Epicures,
who are so taken up with Pleasure of a more substantial kind.’22
Mandeville also comes to mind, for he has a materialist pneumatology
– an account of brain–mind relations – in his Treatise of the hypochondriack
and hysterick diseases, and an Epicurean social theory in the Fable of the bees –
but the two are distinct, even if the latter includes an account of how
individuals are determined by their quest for pleasure.23 La Mettrie
includes this mainstream sense of Epicureanism in his ethics, as I discuss
in the next section: he takes on board this generic modern sense in which
the ancient Epicurean disdain for bodily pleasures is replaced with an
emphasis on these very pleasures.
LaMettrie is also amodern Epicurean in amore original, idiosyncratic
sense: if, following the indication given in the passage from the Abre´ge´ des
syste`mes, he is a modern Epicurean inasmuch as he is like Gassendi and
Lamy, this means (a) that he is a materialist for whommatter is animated,
as it is composed of atoms, molecules and seeds (semences), and (b) that
this animate matter is not the object of study of metaphysicians in their
cabinets, but of the me´decin-philosophe. Similarly, in a related usage of the
term, La Mettrie challenges those he calls ‘les anti-Epicuriens modernes’
(SE, section 10) to explain phenomena such as the appearance of new
species, and organic growth.24
This is all rather reminiscent of the distinction Diderot draws in the
Encyclope´die article ‘Spinosistes’ between ‘ancient Spinosists’ and ‘modern
Spinosists’, in which the former stand for a metaphysics of substance and
modes, whereas the latter specifically assert a metaphysics of living
matter. This ‘modern Spinosism’ is tied to the new theory of biological
epigenesis, that is, the theory of development according to which the
individual form, the embryo, is formed by the successive addition of
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22. Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of men, manners, opinions, times, vol.2: The Moralists: a philosophical
rhapsody (1711; Indianapolis, IN, 2001), part 2, section 1, p.132.
23. Bernard Mandeville, A Treatise of the hypochondriack and hysterick diseases, in three dialogues
(1730), 2nd corrected edn (Delmar, NY, 1976); Enquiry into the origins of moral virtue, in
Mandeville, Bernard, The Fable of the bees, or Private vices, publick benefits, ed. F. B. Kaye, 3rd
revised edn, 2 vols (Oxford, 1924), vol.1, p.41-51.
24. Epicurus, Lucretius and La Mettrie do not describe the evolution or transformation of
species; rather, species are viewed as appearing and disappearing; see Lucretius, De rerum
natura IV.823-57, V.772-877. La Mettrie quotes the ancient view that the earth is like a
womb (‘ute´rus’) which has now grown barren (SE, sections 8-11); he thinks the moderns
can improve experimentally on this view, but does not reject it wholeheartedly.
material layers (rather than by the actualisation of a pre-existing form),
so that the features of the mature organism are acquired gradually in
development, as the embryo undergoes transformations under the
influence of the environment.25 Here is Diderot:
SPINOSISTE, s. m. (Gram.) sectateur de la philosophie de Spinosa. Il ne faut
pas confondre les Spinosistes anciens avec les Spinosistes modernes. Le
principe ge´ne´ral de ceux-ci, c’est que la matie`re est sensible, ce qu’ils
de´montrent par le de´veloppement de l’œuf, corps inerte, qui par le seul
instrument de la chaleur gradue´e passe a` l’e´tat d’eˆtre sentant & vivant, & par
l’accroissement de tout animal qui dans son principe n’est qu’un point, & qui
par l’assimilation nutritive des plantes, en un mot, de toutes les substances
qui servent a` la nutrition, devient un grand corps sentant & vivant dans un
grand espace. De-la` ils concluent qu’il n’y a que de la matie`re, & qu’elle suffit
pour tout expliquer; du reste ils suivent l’ancien spinosisme dans toutes ses
conse´quences.26
And in the satirical work Epıˆtre a` mon esprit, ou l’Anonyme persifle´ (1749), La
Mettrie opposes the obscurity of the ‘Spinosiste Ancien’ to the luminous
clarity of the ‘Spinosiste Moderne’ (EE, p.233) – without, admittedly,
specifying the content of this modern Spinozism. And he wavers
terminologically: sometimes his name for the radical and emerging
philosophy is ‘Epicurean’; sometimes it is ‘Spinozist’.27 La Mettrie is
indeed a self-made epicuro-Spinozist rather than a scholar of
Epicureanism or Spinozism; but the Epicurean context has to be in place
first, from the libertin, free-thinking tradition onwards, for his materialist
reading of Spinoza to be possible.28
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25. The term first appears in William Harvey’s De generatione animalium (1651); Descartes then
defended a version of epigenesis because he wanted all laws of embryo development to be
particular cases of the laws of motion. But the radically philosophical implications of the
notionwere spelled out by Diderot, notably in LeReˆve de D’Alembert and the text cited here.
On the early scientific fortunes of epigenesis, see Linda van Speybroek, Dani de Waele
and Gertrudis van de Vijver, ‘Theories in early embryology’, in From epigenesis to epigenetics,
ed. Linda van Speybroek, Gertrudis van de Vijver and Dani de Waele (New York, 2002),
p.7-49.
26. Diderot, ‘Spinosistes’, in Encyclope´die, ou Dictionnaire raisonne´ des sciences, des arts et des me´tiers,
par une socie´te´ de gens de lettres, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean d’Alembert, 17 vols (Paris and
Neufchaˆtel, Briasson, 1751-1765), vol.15 (1765), p.474a. The best commentary on this text
is AlexandreMe´traux, ‘U¨ber Denis Diderots Physiologisch Interpretierten Spinoza’, Studia
Spinozana 10 (1994), p.121-34.
27. As noted critically by Ann Thomson, ‘La Mettrie et l’e´picurisme’, p.381; but it is equally
plausible to view LaMettrie as perfectly instantiating Jonathan Israel’s idea of ‘Spinosism’
as an artefact of the radical Enlightenment, as distinct from Spinozism understood as a
systematic interpretation of Spinoza’s actual doctrine (Israel, Radical Enlightenment: phil-
osophy and the making of modernity 1650-1750, Oxford, 2001).
28. As noted by Jacques Roger, Les Sciences de la vie dans la pense´e franc¸aise du dix-huitie`me sie`cle
(Paris, 1962), p.462-63. Antony McKenna points to the pre-existence of such a context as
evidence, contra Israel, that there is no radical break (be it Spinosism or Spinozism), since
If one were to take the distinction between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’
Spinozists and apply it to Epicureanism, one might say, then, that the
ancient Epicurean is a physicalist who derives consequences from this
physics for the goal of attaining happiness and avoiding fear, whereas the
modern Epicurean is more immediately biologistic, indeed vitalistic,
since the basic properties of atoms have been expanded to include
chemical and vital features. At the level of conceptual foundations, the
shift is from classical atomism to a vision in which atoms are defined as
tiny portions of living matter (the ‘vital’ reinterpretation of atoms, which
is usually associated with Gassendi and Lamy, can actually be traced back
further, to the Renaissance physician Girolamo Fracastoro).29 At the
level of overall theoretical intention, where ancient Epicureanism was
concerned with balance, freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) and from
fear (superstition), its modern variant brings its hedonistic and materi-
alistic overtones to the fore. As Morgan Meis puts it, ‘many of the early
modern thinkers who became interested in Lucretius and Epicurus and
their materialist natural science reversed the order of priorities in the
Epicurean system. They essentially ignored the ethical standpoint that is
the ultimate goal of natural science [for Epicurus] and took up the
physics and biological investigations as of interest in their own right.’30
Recall that, in the Syste`me d’Epicure, LaMettrie seems to equate being ‘pro-
Epicurean’ (that is, not an anti-Epicurean) with specifically biological
themes such as the appearance and disappearance of animal species
(section 10); similarly, in the next section, he recounts the first stages of
the earth as a fertile, nutritive ground which produces living beings,
reminiscent of Lucretius’ ‘Alma Venus’. It is not just materialism
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Enlightenment free-thinkers are the direct inheritors of an earlier Epicurean tradition
(‘Epicurisme et mate´rialisme au XVIIe sie`cle: quelques perspectives de recherche’, in
Qu’est-ce que les Lumie`res radicales? Libertinage, athe´isme et spinozisme dans le tournant
philosophique de l’aˆge classique, ed. Catherine Secre´tan, Tristan Dagron and Laurent Bove
(Paris, 2007), p.75-85. To the extent that I am claiming that La Mettrie invents something
new with his materialist, medical Epicureanism, my view is methodologically closer to
Israel’s.
29. Fracastoro (1478-1553) put forth a theory of contagious disease founded on an idea of
contagious ‘seeds’ – tiny living bodies (see Vivian Nutton, ‘The reception of Fracastoro’s
theory of contagion’,Osiris 6, 1990, p.196-234). This idea was then reinserted into editions
of Lucretius, so that the latter was quoted in support of the idea of bacteria (Monte
Johnson and Catherine Wilson, ‘Lucretius and the history of science’, in The Cambridge
companion to Lucretius, ed. Stuart Gillespie and Philip Hardie, Cambridge, 2007, p.131-48).
30. Morgan Meis, ‘Science as a cure for fear: the status of monsters in Lucretius’, in Monsters
and philosophy, ed. Charles T. Wolfe (London, 2005), p.21-35 (35). For more details on how
modern Epicureanism ‘betrays’ its ancient model, see Pierre-Franc¸ois Moreau and Anne
Deneys-Tunney, ‘Nouveaux visages de l’e´picurisme’, their introduction to Dix-huitie`me
sie`cle 35, L’Epicurisme des Lumie`res (2003), a special issue on Epicureanism which they edited
(p.8-9).
simpliciter, but rather a materialism of living matter; and it is not a
materialism without an ethics, since it is bolstered by a medical stand-
point in which the ethical returns, as ‘organic, automatic happiness’ (as I
discuss immediately below; see DB, p.244).
So La Mettrie’s Epicureanism has a vital flavour to it; it is bound up
with an idea of animate matter. This tells us that he has not just extended
Cartesian mechanism to humans,31 nor, conversely, grafted Hallerian
irritability onto Cartesian automata, even if he quotes Haller favourably
and, as is well known, dedicated L’Homme-machine to him.32 Both the
property of irritability and the Gassendist emphasis on small parcels of
living matter as ‘semences’ indicate that La Mettrian matter is definitely
not reducible to extension (that is, specifiable solely in terms of shape,
figure and motion). But what does this entail for his ethics? His medical
Epicureanism will turn out to be far more ambitious in scope than that
of Lamy (or Walter Charleton’s contemporary project of explaining
medical disorders in atomistic terms), since it encroaches on moral
matters. For La Mettrie seeks to replace traditional moral philosophy
with a medically grounded or, indeed, medicalised viewpoint: instead of
an ideological happiness which we cannot attain, he thinks the only
‘freedom worth wanting’ is this ‘organic happiness’, the hedonistically,
materially specifiable happiness of our organs.33
La Mettrie’s ethics
La Mettrie was always accused of being an immoralist – a nineteenth-
century Protestant historian of French literature described him as ‘un
me´taphysicien lubrique de la volupte´’34 – less because of the man-
machine hypothesis, and more due to his writings in moral philosophy,
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31. In her masterful study of Montpellier vitalism, Naissance et de´veloppement du vitalisme en
France de la deuxie`me moitie´ du 18e sie`cle a` la fin du Premier Empire, SVEC 381 (2000), Roselyne
Rey curiously repeats these older interpretations of La Mettrie: ‘La Mettrie manque la
spe´cificite´ du vivant’ (p.137). She describes him as a mechanist (p.137, 176), then changes
her mind and has him ‘vitalising’ the Cartesian machine (p.177), but ultimately reiterates
her opposition between the Cartesian–La Mettrian machine and the more complex
vitalist model of organisation. On the latter, see CharlesWolfe, ‘Organisme et organisation:
l’individuation organique selon le vitalismemontpellie´rain’, Dix-huitie`me sie`cle 41, Individus
et communaute´s au XVIIIe sie`cle (Paris, 2009).
32. On La Mettrie’s relation to Haller, see Steinke, Irritating experiments, p.194-97.
33. For further discussion of this notion see my ‘La re´duction me´dicale de la morale chez La
Mettrie’, in Mate´rialistes franc¸ais du XVIIIe sie`cle: La Mettrie, Helve´tius, d’Holbach, ed. Jean-
Claude Bourdin, Francine Markovits et al. (Paris, 2006), p.45-60.
34. Sayous, Histoire de la litte´rature franc¸aise a` l’e´tranger (1853), as quoted by Denise Leduc-
Fayette, ‘Le ‘‘cas’’ La Mettrie’, in Images au XIXe sie`cle du mate´rialisme du XVIIIe sie`cle, ed.
Olivier Bloch (Paris, 1979), p.103-16 (108).
chiefly the Discours sur le bonheur or Anti-Se´ne`que.35 (This work was initially
intended as a biography of Seneca, and indeed first appeared as an essay
accompanying his translation of the latter’s De vita beata.36 Maupertuis
had procured this assignment for La Mettrie, hoping – mistakenly, as it
turned out – that it would restore some of his reputation, in addition to
being a source of income.37 Instead, La Mettrie took the opportunity to
assert his brand of extreme hedonism against Seneca and Stoicism in
general, even though Seneca discusses pleasure in positive – if austere –
terms in De vita beata, book 13).38 Faced with this accusation, that La
Mettrie at best reduced the moral to the physical or the physiological,
and at worst was a deliberate immoralist, many La Mettrians respond by
invoking his status as a medical doctor,39 which may strike one as odd:
how does someone’s professional status affect their philosophical argu-
ments, and even more, their moral credibility?
In fact, La Mettrie himself creates a conceptual equivalence between
me´decin and moraliste: ‘Il serait sans doute a` souhaiter qu’il n’y euˆt pour
juges que d’excellents me´decins. Eux seuls pourraient distinguer le
criminel innocent du coupable’ (HM, p.91). If only judges could be
selected from the ranks of ‘excellent physicians’! That is, La Mettrie
deplores the fact that judgements of life and death are typically made
without any knowledge of the physiological level of determination of
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35. The observation is Ann Thomson’s, in ‘La Mettrie, machines and the denial of liberty’, in
The Renewal of materialism, ed. Charles T.Wolfe,Graduate faculty philosophy journal 22:1 (2000),
p.71-86 (80). Earlier on, Thomson also noted that even post-Revolutionary defenders of
La Mettrie, for instance Sylvain Mare´chal, would only defend works such as L’Homme-
machine, not the Discours sur le bonheur (Materialism and society in the mid-eighteenth century: La
Mettrie’s ‘Discours pre´liminaire’, Geneva, 1981, p.186-87).
36. De vita beata: traite´ de la vie bienheureuse de Se´ne`que, avec un discours du traducteur sur le meˆme sujet
(Potsdam, C. F. Voss, 1748). In 1750 a second edition appeared from the same publisher,
now entitled Anti-Se´ne`que, ou le Souverain bien; the third edition (Amsterdam, C. F. Voss,
1751) bore the same title, as the work has since then.
37. The anecdote regarding Maupertuis occurs in Laurent-Angliviel de La Beaumelle’s Vie de
Maupertuis (Paris, 1856), p.121-23, and Elie Fre´ron’s Lettres sur quelques e´crits, vol.1 (1752;
Geneva, 1962). La Beaumelle’s work was written shortly after Maupertuis’ death, but
published posthumously (see John Falvey’s introduction to his edition of La Mettrie’s
Discours sur le bonheur (Anti-Se´ne`que), SVEC 134, 1975, p.15, and Kathleen Wellman, La
Mettrie: medicine, philosophy and Enlightenment, Durham, NC, 1992, p.214, n.6). On Fre´ron, see
Raymond Boissier, La Mettrie: me´decin, pamphle´taire, et philosophe (Paris, 1931), p.173.
38. This is a discussion which was itself influential in the reassessment of Epicureanism in
early modern Europe. See Louise Fothergill-Payne, ‘Seneca’s role in popularizing
Epicurus in the sixteenth century’, in Atoms, pneuma, and tranquility, ed. M. J. Osler,
p.115-33 (122ff.). On interrelations between Epicureanism and Stoicism in early modern
thought see Hans Blom’s article in this volume.
39. Notably RolandDesne´, ‘L’humanisme de LaMettrie’, La Pense´e 109 (1963), p.93-110; Pierre
Re´tat, ‘Le ‘‘cœur’’ de La Mettrie’, in Me´langes de litte´rature franc¸aise offerts a` Monsieur Rene´
Pintard, eds. Noe´mi Hepp, Robert Mauzi and Claude Pichois (Strasbourg, 1975), p.533-45;
Boissier, La Mettrie; and, to a lesser extent, Wellman, La Mettrie.
action. Some years later, he explicitly stated that if materialism – in other
words, just such knowledge – could have an effect on morals and society,
that effect would be greater ‘mode´ration dans les supplices’ (DB, p.264).
Thus he reduces the traditional domain of moral philosophy to that of
medicine. But which medicine? La Mettrie is definitely not calling for a
reduction of intentional, psychological processes to non-intentional
physical processes, both because of his vision of animate matter (and
its corollary, body as necessarily ‘sensitive’), and because his definition of
the role of medicine is an expansive one, not a purely mechanistic vision
which reduces the body to a system of cogs, pulleys, funnels and the
like:40 ‘Tout ce`de au grand Art de gue´rir. Le me´decin est le seul
Philosophe qui me´rite de sa Patrie.’ (HM, p.62).
The medical doctor is ‘le seul Philosophe qui me´rite de sa Patrie’, first,
because the doctor deals with truth as defined by the materialist, not the
truth of ethical, social or religious conventions, and, second, if we recall
that the traditional task of philosophy is to meditate on life and death,
the doctor deals much more directly with this, as he delivers ‘brevets de
vie et demort’.41 Similarly – and recalling themedical motif in Descartes’
Discours de la me´thode42 – ‘la me´decine seule [peut] changer les esprits et les
mœurs avec le corps’ (HM, p.67), and ‘la meilleure philosophie [est] celle
des me´decins’ (DB, p.36). Fair enough – but why is it the doctor’s
homeland that should be grateful?
On the one hand, this sounds hypocritical on La Mettrie’s part, since
he consistently opposes ‘Truth’, which belongs to the discourses of
medicine and materialist philosophy, to ‘Convention’ or ‘Appearance’,
the category to which not only society and politics, but also ethics belong
in his view (DP, p.13). The fact that doctors are necessarily parts of society
and engage in Realpolitik, as John Falvey puts it43 (and his intuition is
confirmed if we consider the titles of La Mettrie’s lesser-known works
such as Politique du me´decin de Machiavel, ou le Chemin de la fortune ouvert aux
me´decins44 and L’Ouvrage de Pe´ne´lope, ou Machiavel en me´decine), does not
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40. That La Mettrie’s machines are embodied, organic machines does not, however, mean
that they are inspired by Leibniz’s ‘machines de la nature’, as strangely suggested by Peter
H. Reill, Vitalizing nature in the Enlightenment (Berkeley, CA, 2005), p.61-62. LaMettrie never
invokes infinite complexity, a monadic metaphysics or even a naturalised version of the
monad (like Maupertuis’ ‘mole´cules’ or Charles Bonnet’s ‘corps organise´s’).
41. La Mettrie, La Faculte´ venge´e (Paris, Quillau, 1747), p.100.
42. In the sixth part of the Discours de la me´thode, Descartes had granted that the mind is
‘strongly dependent’ on our temperament and the arrangement of our organs, so that our
improvement – both intellectual and practical – is most likely to be achieved by medicine
(Œuvres, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 11 vols, Paris, 1964-1974, vol.6, p.62).
43. La Mettrie, Discours sur le bonheur, ed. J. Falvey, p.46.
44. Subtitled Ouvrage re´duit en forme de conseils par le Dr Fum Ho Ham, traduit sur l’original chinois
par un nouveau maıˆtre es arts [...] contient les portraits des plus ce´le`bres me´decins de Pe´kin
make it any better. Doctors can be Machiavellian liars, ‘fausse
monnaie’,45 or – on the other hand – they can be Epicurean materialists,
legitimate currency. It is with this Epicurean reference that something
positive emerges, which explains, first, why ‘la meilleure philosophie [est]
celle des me´decins’, and, second, why a doctor should be ‘le seul
Philosophe qui me´rite de sa Patrie’.
It may be excessive of La Mettrie to claim that ‘La Me´decine est sans
contredit la plus utile et la plus ne´cessaire de toutes les sciences’,46 not
least since he also holds that the truth of materialism is for an elite, not
something to be spread among the people. But his point applies quite
smoothly to ethics – given that he understands moral matters
eudaimonistically (in terms of happiness). Philosophy always claims to
give us the straightest path to happiness, but La Mettrie rejects what he
calls the ‘bonheur privatif’ of the Stoics (DB, p.239), which consists in
fearing nothing and desiring nothing; its chief figures, in his view, are
Seneca and Descartes. Privative happiness is opposed to what he calls ‘le
bonheur organique, automatique ou naturel’ (DB, p.244): it is natural
because ‘l’Ame n’y entre pour rien’ (p.244), organic because it ‘vient de
l’organisation’ and is ‘le plus beau pre´sent de la Nature’ (DB, p.240). This
happiness is automatic in the sense that it obeys the laws of operation of
our ‘machine’ (a term frequently used in French during this period to
refer to the body).47 It is worth noting that in the medical vitalism of the
Montpellier school (e.g. Bordeu, Me´nuret de Chambaud), but also in
Diderot, who was influenced by them, organisation is asserted as a chal-
lenge to mechanistic models of life. An animal’s organisation is its organic
structure, which is not explainable in purely mechanistic terms. While La
Mettrie is by nomeans a vitalist, he shares this critique of mechanism, for
instance regarding the secretions of the glands.48
But it is in thinking about our organisation that La Mettrie produces
some of his more shocking formulations: ‘Vautre-toi comme les porcs, tu
seras heureux comme les porcs’ (DB, p.286), which could either mean
that, as we have hedonistically determined bodies, our happiness is no
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(Amsterdam, [1746]). Mandeville, too, emphasises the ‘politics’ of medicine, but without
connecting this to his materialist views on the relation of mind and body.
45. La Mettrie, Politique du me´decin de Machiavel, p.xv.
46. La Mettrie, Politique du me´decin de Machiavel, p.xiv.
47. See for instance Gaston Cayrou, Le Franc¸ais classique: lexique de la langue du dix-septie`me sie`cle
(Paris, 1948), ‘Machine’, p.530.
48. Wellman, La Mettrie, p.116-20. It is beyond the scope of the present essay to show how
organisation differs subtly from ‘organism’; see my ‘L’individuation organique selon le
vitalisme montpellie´rain’, and on the unexpected interrelations between mechanist and
(Montpellier) vitalist models, Charles Wolfe and Motoichi Terada, ‘The animal economy
as object and program in Montpellier vitalism’, Science in context 21:4, Vitalism without
metaphysics? Medical vitalism in the Enlightenment (December 2008), section 4, p.537-80.
different than a pig’s, or, recalling the analogy between matter thinking
and a watch telling time, that we are happy, not literally in the same way
as pigs, but analogously (opera delights the opera lover, or fashion the
style maven, like pigs enjoy mud). But if we consider such proclamations
in context, we begin to see the original aspect of La Mettrie’s
Epicureanism: the connection between a medical–materialist approach
to the body and a rethinking of morality, a connection which no other
contemporary, particularly not Diderot, made or was willing to make.
Diderot’s judgement on this brand of hedonismwas quite severe, and was
reminiscent of the accusation that La Mettrie sought to conceal his
(original, modern) Epicureanism beneath a historical veil: ‘Des effe´mine´s,
de laˆches corrompus, pour e´chapper a` l’ignominie qu’ils me´ritaient par
la de´pravation de leurs mœurs, se dirent sectateurs de la volupte´, et le
furent en effet, mais c’e´tait de la leur, et non de celle d’Epicure.’49 In
contrast, La Mettrie argues that a more Stoic, less sensual medicine
would ward off the fear of death, but would be dangerously ascetic: ‘Les
stoı¨ciens sont inaccessibles au plaisir et a` la douleur; nous nous ferons
gloire de sentir l’un et l’autre’ or, worse, ‘Un Stoı¨cien n’a pas plus de
sentiment qu’un le´preux.’50
A hedonistically driven Epicurean medicine, by contrast, would be
devoted to the organic fulfilment of our ‘machine’, since it is composed
of organs which feel and by extension have an inbuilt desiring mechan-
ism: ‘Nos organes sont susceptibles d’un sentiment ou d’unemodification
qui nous plaıˆt et nous fait aimer la vie’ (DB, p.238). This kind of organic
determinism which is unique to each ‘machine’ is described in terms of
the ‘blood’ that flows through our veins and the ‘slope’ or ‘incline’ (pente)
we follow; given that this ‘incline’ is both unique to each individual and a
‘law’ governing all organic beings,51 from the most hardened criminal to
the most gentle, altruistic person, La Mettrie describes it as the ‘pente
inhumaine de l’humanite´’ (DB, p.262). Individuals are virtuous or vicious
depending on their blood: ‘le Tyran, l’assassin, comme l’honneˆte homme’
(DB, p.262) – all are in pursuit of their happiness; these are the parts of La
Mettrie that Sade liked especially.52
Notice, however, that the organic dimension of this determinism gives
it a great deal of ‘plasticity’ or modifiability: the orang-utan merely
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49. Diderot, Essai sur les re`gnes de Claude et de Ne´ron, in Œuvres, vol.1: Philosophie, ed. Laurent
Versini (Paris, 1994), p.971-1251 (1192). On this aspect of the Diderot–LaMettrie relation
see Timo Kaitaro’s fine paper ‘Diderot and La Mettrie: the unacknowledgeable debt’, in
La Mettrie: Ansichte und Einsichte, ed. Hartmut Hecht, p.63-73.
50. Respectively, Discours sur le bonheur, ed. J. Falvey, p.122, and DB, p.247.
51. As Hans Blom put it (discussion, Oxford, June 2006), what makes man a swerving atom
also makes him a reliable part of the social structure.
52. Jean Deprun, ‘La Mettrie et l’immoralisme sadien’, Annales de Bretagne et des pays de l’Ouest
83:4 (1976), p.745-50.
requires an operation on his larynx and being sent to school in order to
learn how to speak (HM, p.76-77). If we are the creatures of our organ-
isation (in fact, we are our organisation), this does not mean that we are
Turing machines, or that we lack individuality, since no one has the same
‘blood’ or total organisation as anyone else. Of course, I do not mean to
obscure the bleakness of the social landscape implied by this vision, in
which education cannot really, durably reform individuals and their
appetites. Granted, it was mistaken and perhaps glib of Foucault to
describe LaMettrie’s man-machine as a figure of discipline and ‘training’
(dressage), like a philosophical avatar of tiny military automata lined up
for the inspection of Frederick II,53 but that does not mean that La
Mettrian individuals are any more free than these automata. They are
simply more complex and possessed of a biological uniqueness, their
organisation.
La Mettrie’s ‘medical Epicureanism’
At the very beginning of L’Homme-machine, La Mettrie explains that he
belongs to the oldest philosophical tradition, materialism, whereas spiri-
tualism is amore recent arrival (HM, p.63). Aside from the strict emphasis
on animate matter, Epicureanism also provides him with a hedonistic
theory of the pursuit of individual happiness, which turns out to be
‘organic’ happiness, the happiness of our organisation. ‘La Nature nous a
tous cre´e´s uniquement pour eˆtre heureux’ (HM, p.92): humans are made
to be happy rather than to be the possessors of knowledge. This anti-
rationalistic claim is motivated by La Mettrie’s view that all claims about
‘rational animals’ or rationality as the specific difference of humans
remain blind to the instinctual level, the organic determinism which is
proper to each individual machine or organisation. In this sense, then, he
brings a kind ofmedical empiricism to bear against ‘Reason’ writ large (‘A
force deRaison, onparvient a` faire peude cas de laRaison’, SE, section 31,
p.363) without, however, turning his medically motivated Epicureanism
into a specific, experimentally specifiable medical concept.
To be sure, La Mettrie is not a scholar of Epicureanism; many of his
references, including perhaps those to Gassendi, may be second-hand. In
addition, he occasionally attributes doctrines belonging to one author, to
another, whether deliberately or out of carelessness.54 This may explain
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53. Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris, 1975), ch.3, section 1, ‘Les corps dociles’, p.138.
54. Theo Verbeek’s critical edition of LaMettrie’s first philosophical work, Le Traite´ de l’aˆme de
La Mettrie, texte, commentaire, et interpre´tation, 2 vols (Utrecht, 1988), is the classic, virtuoso
‘decomposition’ of the unity of La Mettrie’s work into a welter of half-baked, derivative
citations and paraphrases; as such, it suffers from an inability to recognise any originality
or conceptual coherence in La Mettrie – a coherence which I argue for, here and
elsewhere.
moments like the odd juxtaposition of Boerhaave, Gassendi and Lamy.
Nevertheless, whether we consider his combination of materialism and
ethics, of doctrines and practices, to be mere bricolage (‘retourne´ et mal
cousu’!) or not, the result should be considered as the invention55 of a
new and perhaps unique form of Epicureanism in and for the Enlight-
enment: neither a mere hedonism nor a strict materialist speculation on
the nature of living bodies, but a ‘medical Epicureanism’. If ancient
Epicureanism was a physics that was meant to culminate in an ethics, and
(mainstream) modern Epicureanism, as deplored by Shaftesbury, re-
places the pleasures of the mind with the pleasures of the body, medical
Epicureanism, as in Gassendi and Lamy, returns to the atoms themselves,
but now as living, vitalised atoms. La Mettrie brings together the hedon-
istic and the vital–materialistic components of this new form of
Epicureanism, promoting the happiness of our bodily organisation, which
he describes as being organic, automatic and natural. Who is in a
position to know the functional laws of our organisation? The physician-
philosopher, which is to say, the medical Epicurean.
La Mettrie’s ‘Art de gue´rir’ (HM, p.62) does away with the dilemma of
happiness and virtue by invoking the deeper structure, as opposed to a
surface ethics, which relies on the dualism of body and soul, or at least
bodily properties and mental properties. It is the deep organic structure
of the man-machine, which follows the norm of health: ‘De toutes les
espe`ces de bonheur, je pre´fe`re celle qui se de´veloppe avec nos organes, et
semble se trouver plus ou moins, comme la force, dans tous les corps
anime´s.’ (DB, p.247).
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55. I use this term partly in the sense in which Yves Citton has recently spoken of an
‘invention of Spinozism’ in the eighteenth century, in his inspiring work L’Envers de la
liberte´: l’invention d’un imaginaire spinoziste dans la France des Lumie`res (Paris, 2006). An
invention in Citton’s sense is a conceptual performance that extends well beyond
recognisable textual commentary on an author (Epicurus, Spinoza and so on) and also
includes the conceptual innovations of antagonists such as apologeticists.
